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executive summary
In December 2004, Specialist Thomas Wilson, a scout on his way to Iraq 
with the Tennessee National Guard, caused a media firestorm by asking 
then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about Humvee armor shortages: 
“Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap 
metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles and why 
don’t we have those resources readily available to us?”1 Others in his 
unit agreed that they were undermanned and underequipped. Spc. Blaze 
Crook, a truck driver, said, “I don’t think we have enough troops going in 
to do the job.”2
Most military experts now agree that years of war and the spring 2007 
“surge” have pushed our military to the breaking point. According to 
General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 
“The demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.”3 Admiral 
Michael G. Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has agreed, 
acknowledging that the current policy of an increased U.S. force presence 
in Iraq cannot continue past April 2008.4 
The consequences of our overextension are dire. General Peter Pace, 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes that there is a 
significant risk that the U.S. military will not be able to respond effectively 
if confronted with another crisis.5 By spring 2008, all four brigades of the 
82nd Airborne, the Army’s rapid response division, will be deployed to Iraq 
or Afghanistan, leaving the Army without “a rapid response capability for 
other crises around the globe.”6 Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, 
President Bush’s new war adviser, has gone so far as to say that a military 
draft is worth considering.7
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Forced to fill the ranks without a draft, the military has 
faced serious problems with recruitment. The Pentagon 
has responded by lowering age, education, and aptitude 
standards for new recruits, as well as increasing enlistment 
bonuses. In March 2007, the National Guard actually ran 
out of funds for marketing and advertising.8 The costs of 
retention have sky-rocketed to over $1 billion, six times the 
amount spent in 2003. The military has also held 70,000 
troops on active-duty beyond their expected contract end-
dates—a controversial policy known as “Stop Loss”—and 
has called up 15,000 veterans, many of whom have not put 
on a uniform in years. 
The military now regularly requires troops to serve 
multiple, extended combat tours. Over 449,000 troops 
have served more than one combat tour, and many have 
returned to war after only a few months rest.9 Active-duty 
Army combat tours are now 15 months long, with only 
half the recommended “dwell time” at home between 
tours. The increased tempo is expected to have a major 
impact on service members’ health. According to a military 
survey, soldiers serving multiple tours are 50 percent more 
likely to suffer from a mental health problem. 
Equipment shortages have contributed to the plummeting 
readiness ratings of Army and Marine units, threatening 
our ability to cope with foreign threats and domestic 
emergencies. By September 2006, “Roughly one-half 
of all Army units (deployed and non-deployed, active 
and reserves) received the lowest readiness rating any 
fully formed unit can receive.”10 About four-fifths of 
Army Guard and Reserve units not mobilized received 
the lowest possible readiness rating. State officials in 
California, Kansas and Oregon have publicly expressed 
grave concerns about the damage done to our domestic 
security. According to the Government Accountability 
Office, 20 states and territories now have “inadequate 
capability” to fulfill key domestic security missions.15 This 
situation is so dire that, in 2006, all 50 governors signed 
a letter calling on President Bush to ensure the National 
Guard is re-equipped. 
According to Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “[T]
he Army and Marine Corps equipment is in such a state 
of disrepair that it will take years and tens of billions 
of dollars to repair or replace.”16 The Army has already 
received over $38 billion dollars to repair or replace 
equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is 
estimated that reset costs will be $13 billion a year for 
the duration of combat.
inadequate troop strength
The Scope of the Problem
Recruiting Shortfalls Lead to 
Higher Costs, Lower Standards
Despite investing more than $4 billion annually in 
recruitment,17 the Army and Marines have recently 
encountered serious difficulties getting enough people to 
enlist. As the Army and Marines plan to increase the force 
by 92,000 troops in four years, recruitment will continue 
to be a challenge for the foreseeable future.18 
Recruitment problems began in 2004, when the National 
Guard missed their recruitment goal for the first time in 
ten years, falling 5,000 enlistees short of their goal of 
56,000.19 The Army20 and Army Reserves21 achieved their 
targets, but only by rushing new recruits into service.22 
Speeding enlistments to count towards 2004 goals left 
an extra burden on recruiters for 2005, and the Army, 
Army Reserves, Army National Guard, and Marines all 
missed month after month of recruiting goals.23 At the 
A Look at the Numbers 
1.5 million American troops have served in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.11 There are 
about 22,00012 troops serving in Afghanistan 
and 169,00013 troops in Iraq. All of the 
Army’s available combat brigades are either 
in Iraq or Afghanistan or set to deploy.14
active-duty army combat tours 
are now 15 months long, with only 
half the recommended “dwell 
time” at home between tours.
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In addition, the Army is now accepting far more people with 
criminal backgrounds. From 2004 to 2005, the number 
of recruits who were issued waivers for having committed 
‘serious criminal misconduct,’ such as aggravated assault 
or robbery, “rose by more than 54 percent.”42 The number 
of waivers continued to rise in 2006, reaching 8,129,43 or 
one in ten new recruits. Of this number, 900 waivers were 
for felonies, double the amount in 2003. The numbers 
in 2007 were even worse. The percentage of recruits 
receiving waivers for criminal convictions has risen to 12 
percent, from 10 percent last year.44 Furthermore, a recent 
report by the FBI and the Army’s Criminal Investigation 
Command links looser recruiting standards and more 
criminal waivers to an increase in gang-related activity in 
the military.45 
Increased Recruitment Bonuses
The maximum enlistment bonus in 2006 was $40,000, 
up from $20,000 in previous years, while the average 
enlistment bonus reached $11,000.46 There are new 
bonuses available for enlistees with specific civilian skills, 
and those willing to perform jobs the military has deemed 
‘high-priority.’47 In July 2007, the Army began offering 
a popular new $20,000 bonus to any recruit willing to 
ship out within 30 days.48 As a result, the overall cost of 
end of the 2005 fiscal year, the Army was still about 
7,000 soldiers short—the largest recruiting gap since 
1979.24 Recruitment has dropped dramatically among 
African-Americans.25
In 2006, recruitment figures improved,26 and the Army 
National Guard finally re-achieved its overall personnel 
goal in April 2007.27 But signs of trouble persist. The Army 
missed their monthly goals in May and June 2007,28 and 
started the FY2008 recruiting year dramatically behind 
schedule.29 Moreover, thousands of new recruiters, lowered 
standards, and upped signing bonuses are necessary to 
hold a recruitment crisis at bay. 
Increase in Recruiters 
The Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve have 
all increased their recruiter pool during the Iraq War.30 
After the initial recruiting shortfalls in 2004, the Army 
assigned an additional 1,000 soldiers to recruiting duty,31 
and another 500 recruiters were hired in mid-2005.32 As 
of October 2006, the Army was relying on 6,500 recruiters 
to meet their personnel goals.33 In July 2007, the Army 
was forced to order more than 1,000 former recruiters 
back to their recruiting stations.34 The Army has also 
been giving a bonus to any soldier who brings someone 
into the Armed Forces.35 
Lowered Standards
Traditionally, only about three out of ten applicants meet 
the Army’s standards for enlistment.36 But shortages of 
new recruits have forced the military to accept lower-
caliber recruits to fill the ranks. 
The Army has lowered standards in terms of age, 
education, and aptitude. The maximum age for a new 
recruit has been raised.37 The goal of having 92 percent 
of enlistees with regular high school diplomas was 
lowered to 90 percent in October 2004,38 but even this 
lowered standard has not been met in the past two years. 
In 2006, only 81 percent of enlistees had a high-school 
diploma.39 In fact, the military is now reaching out to 
high-school dropouts, helping 13,000 recruits earn their 
GEDs since 2005.40 More recruits are failing the enlistee 
aptitude test as well. The maximum acceptance of low-
scoring troops was increased from 2 percent of total 
enlistees to 4 percent in 2006. In 2006, 3.8 percent of 
first-time recruits had low aptitude scores.41 
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enlistment bonuses has risen dramatically. The Army’s 
expenditures for enlistment bonuses for active-duty, 
National Guard and Reserve troops have more than 
doubled from 2000 to 2005.49 
Unethical Recruiting Practices
The military prosecutes hundreds of cases of recruiter 
fraud each year.50 As pressure on recruiters has grown, 
so have cases of unethical recruitment practices. Military 
recruiter violations increased 50 percent from 2004 to 
2005.51 Investigative reporters using hidden cameras have 
recorded recruiters misleading potential recruits about 
the dangers of combat and their chances of going to 
Iraq. Other recruiters were caught helping recruits forge 
paperwork, cheat drug tests and threatening potential 
recruits with jail time if they did not enlist.52 As a result 
of the abuses, the Army re-instructed recruiters on ethics 
rules in May 2005.53
At High Cost, Retention Remains Strong
In contrast to recruiting, military retention has remained 
relatively strong, particularly in the active duty.54 Since 
September 11, 2001, more than 700,000 soldiers have re-
enlisted in the Army.55 The Army and Marines have con-
sistently met or exceeded their retention goals, while the 
National Guard and Reserve components have suffered 
only slight shortfalls.56 But retention costs have soared, 
reaching over a billion dollars in 2006, six times the 
amount spent in 2003.57 
Even these gloomy numbers may not be telling the whole 
story. Several recent reports suggest that the Army has also 
chosen to retain more troops who, in earlier years, might 
have been discharged for poor performance or drug and 
alcohol abuse.58 Furthermore, some reports have suggested 
that the military is misrepresenting the figures on injured 
troops to make the Army seem more battle-ready.59
Manpower Crisis Hits Crucial  
Military Roles and Ranks
Personnel shortfalls are not spread evenly across the armed 
forces; certain military roles are especially shorthanded.
The 41 percent of military jobs, known as “Military 
Occupational Specialties” or MOS, are underfilled,60 
including crucial roles like recruiters, human intelligence 
collectors, physicians, dentists, and nurses.61 
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In addition, the military has seen an exodus of qualified 
junior and midlevel officers and enlisted personnel. 
Retention and recruitment problems, combined with 
the ongoing effect of military downsizing in the 1990s, 
have led to a shortage of “364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 
majors, and 798 captains.”62 In one striking example of 
the retention problem, nearly 50 percent of recent West 
Point graduates are leaving the Army as soon as their 
mandatory commitment is completed. Usually, no more 
than 30 percent of these high-caliber officers leave this 
early in their service.63 There are early signs that the middle 
enlisted ranks are starting to suffer similar shortfalls. In 
the first quarter of 2007, the re-enlistment rate of mid-
grade enlisted soldiers dropped 12 percent, from 96 
percent to 84 percent. 
The Army has responded by speeding promotions64 and 
by trying to attract officers from the other branches of 
the military, using bonuses of up to $10,000.65 Midlevel 
officers and enlisted soldiers are now receiving re-
enlistment bonuses of up to $35,000.66 The Army has 
also borrowed personnel extensively. According to 
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, over 
20,000 airmen have been reassigned to roles for which 
they are not trained.67 These stop-gap solutions may 
temporarily ease the strain, but will not solve the 
fundamental problem of troop shortages. As military 
experts have warned, these departing mid-rank officers 
and NCOs should be considered “canaries in the 
readiness coal-mine.”68
The Effects of Inadequate Troop Strength
‘Backdoor Draft’ and Band-Aid  
Solutions Used to Fill the Ranks
Not all troops staying in the military after their contracts 
end have remained in the service voluntarily. Over 70,000 
service members,69 mostly in the Army,70 have been affected 
by “Stop Loss.” Rarely used before the Iraq war,71 Stop Loss 
is a military policy that extends troops’ service months and 
even years beyond their expected commitment. In early 2007, 
Secretary Gates sent a memo to Pentagon officials suggesting 
that the use of Stop Loss should be “minimized,”72 but about 
8,000 troops are still being held on Stop Loss orders.73 
While military officials have said that Stop Loss is 
necessary to get trained and cohesive units into combat,74 
the extensions exact a tremendous toll on troops and their 
families. Even military officials, including then-Secretary of 
the Air Force James G. Roche, have admitted the policy “is 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of voluntary 
service.”75 The fine print in military contracts does inform 
the enlistee of this obligation, so legal challenges to Stop 
Loss have been unsuccessful.76 But because few service 
members were aware of Stop Loss at the start of the war, 
veterans’ advocates and members of Congress have derided 
the policy as a ‘backdoor draft.’77 
In addition to issuing Stop Loss orders, the military has 
also tried to fulfill their manpower needs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by shifting troops from one unit to another. 
In order to meet requirements for deployment, the military 
has been forced to rely on “cross-leveling.” According to 
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 
cross-leveling, which is the borrowing of individual service 
members from units around the country, has “deleterious 
effects on unit cohesion, training, and readiness and on 
the ability of the reserve components to provide support 
to the families of mobilized reservists.”78 
The military has also called up more than 4,000 Marines79 
and 6,000 soldiers80 from the Individual Ready Reserve 
(IRR). The IRR is a pool of veterans who have completed 
their active-duty service, now live as civilians, and have 
sometimes not trained in years.81 When the Army initially 
called up IRR soldiers in 2004, nearly half attempted 
to put off their service or avoid the call-up altogether.82 
Unsurprisingly, these veterans are deemed “one of the last 
resources the Army taps for manpower.”83
in addition, the military has 
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Troops Serving Multiple Tours  
and Longer Deployments
Army doctrine states that active-duty troops should spend 
no more than 12 consecutive months in combat.84 However, 
since the start of the Iraq War, tours have regularly been 
extended beyond one year. At least 10 Army brigades 
have had their tours extended.85 In one extreme example, 
2,600 members of the Minnesota National Guard served a 
22-month tour— almost two years.86 
Unlike in previous wars, deployments to Iraq are often 
followed by second, third, and even fourth or fifth tours. 
At least 449,000 troops have deployed more than once, 
including 170,000 Army soldiers, 169,000 Marines, and 
84,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists.87 In the 
Army alone, 20 combat brigades have served two tours 
in Iraq, 9 have served three tours, and two have served 
four tours.88 20,000 service members have been deployed 
at least five times.89
The military recommends that troops spend at least two 
years at home between combat tours.90 This is called “dwell 
time,” and includes one year to reset and recuperate, and 
one year to retrain. Anything less has a negative impact on 
combat readiness.91 
While the length of tours has been rising, the time 
between tours has been dropping steadily. The average 
dwell time for Army combat brigades is currently less than 
a year.92 For some troops, including the First Brigade, 3rd 
Infantry Division,93 the rest between deployments is as 
short as a few months. This affects not only the morale 
of the troops, but also their readiness and training. The 
First Brigade, 3rd ID is also one of two Army brigades that 
returned to Iraq in spring 2007 without their usual desert 
combat training at Ft. Irwin.94 The Army has shortened 
several of its training courses so that troops can return to 
Iraq more quickly.95 
What had been a piece-meal strategy of tour extensions 
is now Pentagon policy. As of spring 2007, Defense 
Secretary Gates has increased active-duty Army combat 
tours from 12 to 15 months,96 with a guarantee of a 
year at home between tours (half the recommended 
dwell time).97 Politicians on both sides of the aisle 
have also expressed doubts about this plan. John 
Warner, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, has suggested that the extensions put the 
all-volunteer force at risk,98 while Ike Skelton, chairman 
of the House Armed Services Committee, has called 
IN PersoN: MIke krAuse
In March of 2004, Mike Krause returned from two concurrent overseas tours 
in Iraq and Afghanistan totaling over 18 months. His Army contract was set 
to expire in less than a year. But in June 2004, after just three months at home, 
Krause and almost 40 members of his unit were Stop-Lossed. In October 
2004, Krause returned to Iraq for a second year-long deployment. Between 
2002 and 2005, Krause spent a total of 30 months on a combat tour.
half a million troops have 
deployed to iraq or afghanistan 
more than once. 20,000 service 
members have served five tours.
2,600 members of the minnesota 
national guard served a 22-month 
tour—almost two years.
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the longer tours “an additional burden to an already 
overstretched Army.”99 
These repeated tours increase the rates of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder and other mental illnesses among 
veterans. According to an Army survey, “soldiers are 
50 percent more likely” to suffer from a mental health 
problem if they serve multiple tours.100 The military’s 
own Mental Health Advisory Team has recommended 
extending troops’ rest time to 18-36 months or decreasing 
deployment length.101 
Overuse of the National Guard and Reserves 
Traditionally, Reservists and National Guardsmen, or 
“citizen soldiers,” are part-time troops who train for one 
weekend per month, plus an additional two weeks per 
year. The Reserves and the Guard (together known as the 
Selected Reserve) are usually called to serve in times of 
domestic crisis – hurricanes, floods, and other national 
disasters.102 For instance, 50,000 National Guardsmen 
responded to Hurricane Katrina.103 
In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the reserve component 
makes up a major part of our force, at times as much as 40 
percent.104 Currently, it comprises about 24 percent of the 
force in theatre.105 As the GAO has reported, “Some of the 
skills in highest demand for current operations… reside 
heavily or primarily in the Army National Guard and Army 
Reserve,”106 including “97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs 
units, 70 percent of its engineering units, 66 percent of its 
military police, and 50 percent of its combat forces.”107 In 
total, more than 500,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists 
have served in Iraq or Afghanistan, and every National Guard 
combat brigade has deployed at least once.108 
Until recently, National Guardsmen and Reservists could 
only be called up for 24 months in a five year period. Since 
National Guard deployments include 6 months of training 
and a year-long deployment, any reserve component unit 
that had already served a tour in Iraq was ineligible for 
a second deployment. By fall 2006, only 50,000 National 
Guardsmen and 56,000 Army Reservists were still eligible 
for a tour in Iraq.109 But in January 2007, Secretary Gates 
changed the rules,110 making National Guardsmen and 
Reservists eligible to re-deploy even if they have already 
served more than a year in combat. 
Because we rely on our National Guard and Reserves 
to respond to national disasters, having such a large 
percentage of our reserve forces overseas represents a 
serious national security risk. For instance, the response 
to Hurricane Katrina was slowed because one-third of the 
Louisiana and Mississippi National Guard were deployed 
to Iraq or Afghanistan.111 There are numerous other 
examples of overuse of the Guard and Reserve resulting 
in delayed or inadequate responses to domestic needs. 
In Oregon, officials have warned that “because many of 
the state’s Guard forces and equipment were deployed,” 
statewide response to forest fires would be less effective.112 
In addition, many National Guardsmen and Reservists 
have civilian jobs as “first responders” – firefighters, police 
officers, and emergency medical technicians. The call-ups 
of these reserve troops, therefore, have a doubly negative 
effect on domestic readiness. As Senator Hillary Clinton 
has explained, “Many communities are being left short-
handed… In New York City we have 300 fire fighters who are 
reservists, 99 have already been called up.”113 According to 
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the 
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current policy is simply not sustainable.114 Lt. General Blum, 
chief of the National Guard, has said the reserve component 
is facing its worst state of readiness in 35 years.115 
equipment shortages in 
theatre and at home
The Scope of the Problem
Shortages in Iraq
Since the Iraq war began, poor planning and the failure 
to promptly adapt to changes in enemy tactics have led to 
widespread shortages of crucial equipment. The Pentagon, 
however, has been slow to acknowledge and respond to 
the deficits, and members of Congress have repeatedly 
pressured the Defense Department to invest in gear that 
top military officials initially deemed unneccessary.116 
Vehicle and body armor that protects our troops were the 
subject of some of the most severe shortages. Between 
October 2002 and September 2004, shortfalls of critical 
items such as interceptor body armor, up-armored 
Humvees, and add-on-armor kits “reduced operational 
capacity and increased risk to troops in Iraq,” according 
to the Government Accountability Office.117 During the 
initial invasion, over one-quarter of troops in Iraq were 
not provided with the ceramic-plate body armor that 
would protect against assault rifle bullets.118 Some service 
members resorted to purchasing their own substitutes, 
spending as much as $650 out of pocket to buy Interceptor 
Body Armor vests and small arms protective insert plates 
to replace the Vietnam-era flak vests.119 As the insurgency 
became more deadly, thin-skinned Humvees were an easy 
target for roadside bombs, but the military was slow to 
respond to the dire need for up-armored vehicles.120 In 
2007, some in Congress argued that a shortage of Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) has cost the 
lives of hundreds of Americans who would have otherwise 
survived the roadside bombs.121
Other branches of the military suffered some gaps in 
equipment,122 but the shortages fell most heavily on the 
Army and Marine Corps. The Army in particular suffered a 
wide range of shortfalls, in part because they began the war 
in Iraq with an estimated $56 billion equipment shortage.123 
By December 2003, Army units in Iraq were already 
“struggling just to maintain…relatively low readiness rates” 
on M-1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and anti-
mortar radars, and troops were waiting an average of 40 
days for critical spare parts.124 Some units in Iraq reported 
shortages of mission-critical supplies and equipment, such 
as Black Hawk helicopter parts, bandages, and life-saving 
equipment.125 The Marine Corps’ inspector general found 
that Marines were also lacking key equipment,126 and that 
less than ten percent of equipment requests from Marine 
units in Iraq were being processed.127 
Although the most egregious equipment shortages have 
been resolved, some serious problems remain. The Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars have consumed 40 percent of the 
Army and Marine Corps’ total gear,128 and much of the 
military’s equipment is in need of repair.129 The DOD 
Inspector General recently concluded that there are still 
shortages of some advanced equipment in theatre, and 
troops are forced to delay operations while they wait for 
appropriate equipment to become available.130 
Shortages at Home
Domestic equipment shortages are a severe and growing 
problem, especially in the Reserve component. In peace-
time, these units are not kept at full strength; the Army 
National Guard and Reserve were short about 15-20 
during the initial invasion, over 
one-quarter of troops in iraq 
were not provided with the 
ceramic-plate body armor that 
would protect against assault 
rifle bullets.
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percent of their personnel and 30 percent of their 
equipment when the war began.131 As units rotated 
through Iraq and Afghanistan, gear was used and 
destroyed, and departing units left some of their usable 
equipment for those troops sent to replace them. Between 
2003 and 2005, the Army National Guard left overseas a 
total of over $1.2 billion worth of gear.132 
As a result, the Guard is now suffering the greatest 
equipment shortfall it has seen in 35 years. In October 2002, 
87 percent of National Guard units had the minimum 
amount of equipment necessary to deploy. By May 2005, 
the percentage of units that met this standard had dropped 
to 59 percent.133 From 2002 to 2005, the average number 
of Army National Guard units needed to contribute the 
equipment necessary to deploy one unit tripled.134 
Units mobilized for combat are given priority in terms of 
procurement, so reserve units protecting the homeland are 
the hardest hit by the equipment gap. In the United States, 
the Guard has only 30 percent of its essential equipment in 
the United States. About four-fifths of unmobilized Army 
Guard and Reserve units have the lowest possible readiness 
rating,135 and 88 percent of unmobilized National Guard 
units are considered very poorly equipped. 136 Some of the 
most crucial equipment has been in shortest supply; in July 
2005, the Army National Guard had less than 20 percent 
of the authorized inventory of night-vision goggles.137
The Effects of Equipment Shortages
The Army has already received over $38 billion dollars to 
repair or replace equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and is asking for another $13 billion a year until the conflicts 
wind down.138 And yet shortages remain, hindering troop 
training and threatening domestic preparedness for a 
terrorist attack or natural disaster.
Hindered Military Training 
Equipment shortages have severely hindered troop 
training. Members of the Iowa National Guard resorted 
to training on vehicles from the 1970’s because of equip-
ment shortages in local units.139 In 2006, Colorado Na-
tional Guardsmen had to spend six additional months 
training away from home because of local equipment 
shortages.140 
Homeland Security at Risk
Usable domestic equipment is not just for training; it’s 
also the equipment used to respond to natural disasters 
and domestic crises. Governors across the country have 
begun to speak out about the equipment shortfalls that 
are leaving their communities at risk. After her state 
was wracked by tornados, Kansas Governor Kathleen 
Sebelius said: 
Fifty percent of our trucks are gone. Our front loaders 
are gone. We are missing Humvees that move people. 
We can’t borrow them from other states because their 
equipment is gone. It’s a huge issue for states across the 
country to respond to disasters like this.141 
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Colonel Eric Peck of the Kansas National Guard reiterated 
these concerns, pointing out that the vehicle shortage 
was slowing the relief effort.142 Although in 2006 all 
50 governors called on President Bush to ensure the 
National Guard was re-equipped,143 the shortages have 
not been resolved. Early in the summer of 2007, both 
Governor Schwarzenegger and California Guard officials 
expressed concerns that a truck shortage at home would 
impede a rapid response to serious wildfires.144 Later that 
year, wildfires destroyed almost half a million acres in 
Southern California.145 
According to the Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves, “[T]he equipment readiness of the Army National 
Guard is unacceptable and has reduced the capability of 
the United States to respond to current and additional 
major contingencies, foreign and domestic.”146 According 
to some military experts, 90 percent of National Guard 
units are not ready to respond to a domestic crisis.147
conclusion
Specialist Wilson spoke for many troops when he 
questioned Secretary Rumsfeld about armor shortages. 
Like many of his fellow soldiers, he was also quick to say 
that lack of equipment was not going to keep him from 
doing his job: “I’m a soldier, and I’ll do this on a bicycle if 
I have to.”148
But no amount of bravery on the part of our troops can 
compensate for the tremendous shortages of gear and 
personnel caused by four years of fighting two wars. The 
war in Iraq has indeed exhausted our military and left 
the homeland at risk. As General Peter Schoomaker, the 
former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, warns: 
“While our Soldiers are responding with extraordinary 
commitment, particularly in the face of adversity and 
personal hardships, we cannot allow this condition to 
persist.”149 
Although serious questions remain about the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Defense Department procurement 
and acquisitions,150 fixing near-term equipment shortages 
is largely a matter of time, commitment and correctly 
prioritized funding. However, there are no simple 
solutions to the personnel shortages we have seen result 
from the Iraq War. Stop Loss, multiple and repeated tours, 
and cross-leveling are ineffective as long-term strategies to 
maintain troop numbers. IAVA opposes the use of these 
stop-gap measures. Instead, every effort must be made to 
encourage high-quality recruits to join the military. One 
crucial recruitment tool IAVA recommends is a new GI 
Bill that covers the cost of college. For IAVA’s complete 
recommendations on military readiness, see our Legislative 
Agenda, available at www.iava.org/dc.
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recommended reading and online sources
For more information about the GI Bill’s education benefits as a recruiting tool, see the 
IAVA Issue Report: “Rewarding our Troops, Rebuilding our Military: A New GI Bill.” 
To learn more about the mental health effects of multiple, prolonged deployments, see 
the IAVA Issue Reports: “Mental Health Injuries: The Invisible Wounds of War” and 
“Traumatic Brain Injury: the Signature Wound of the Iraq War.” All IAVA reports are 
available at www.iava.org/dc. 
You can also learn more about military readiness from the following sources:
• Phillip Carter and Brad Flora, “I Want You… Badly: A Complete Guide to Uncle Sam’s 
 Recruiting Incentives,” Slate, November 7, 2007: 
 http://www.slate.com/id/2177426.
• Phillip Carter, “Rebuilding America’s Reserves,” Progressive Policy Institute, November 2007. 
• General Barry McCaffrey, “Testimony before the United States House of Representatives 
 Armed Services Committee,” July 31, 2007: 
 http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI073107/McCaffrey_Testimony073107.pdf. 
• Lawrence J. Korb, “Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Armed 
 Services Committee, July 27, 2007: 
 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/07/pdf/Korb_Testimony.pdf. 
•  Reps. Murtha and Obey, “United States Army Military Readiness,” September 13, 2006: 
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_rpt/060913-murtha- 
 obey_army-readiness.htm. 
• GAO-07-224, “Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging 
 Officer Ascension and Retention Challenges,” January 2007: 
 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07224.pdf.
• Lawrence Korb et al., “Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the Overuse 
 of the Army in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, August 2007: 
 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/readiness_report.html.
• Congressional Budget Office, “Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used in Iraq and 
 Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program,” September 2007: 
 http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8629/09-13-ArmyReset.pdf. 
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